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DOCUMENT 8: 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Timothy Whitton
Pendant les années 60 le gouvernement travailliste tente de remettre de l'ordre
dans  ses  relations  avec  le  mouvement  syndical.  On  considère  que  celui-ci
outrepasse ses droits acquis au fil des ans au point de contribuer non seulement à
la grave crise économique que traverse le pays mais aussi au climat de tensions
qui règne au sein du Parti travailliste.
En  1968,  Barbara  Castle,  ministre  de  l'Emploi  est  chargée de  faire  des
propositions  pour  améliorer  la  collaboration  entre  son  gouvernement  et  les
syndicats. Ses conclusions sont publiées sous forme d'un livre blanc intitulé ‘In
Place  of  Strife’  et  reflètent  la  volonté  de  concilier  la  libre  négociation  des
salaires (free collective bargaining) revendiquée par les syndicats avec le droit
d'intervention que doit assumer un gouvernement en exercice compte tenu des
responsabilités politiques que son mandat lui confère.
BARBARA CASTLE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT 
AND PRODUCTIVITY “IN PLACE OF STRIFE: 
A POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS”, 
JANUARY 1969
The role of government in industrial relations
[...]
5. The  State  has  always  been  involved  in  the  process  of  industrial
relations. It has always had to provide a framework of law for dealing with
the activities of individuals and groups struggling to advance and protect
their  interests.  The  growth  of  employer  power  in  the  19
th
 century
challenged the  adequacy of  the conventional  doctrine  of  “laissez-faire”
and highlighted the need for employees to combine in their own defence.
The result was the growth of trade unions which led Parliament and the
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courts  to  examine how far  the law should  tolerate  “coercive”  action in
“restraint of trade” by employers or trade unions and how far it  should
seek  to  defend  the  wider  interests  of  the  community.  In  the  ensuing
debate  on  the  principles  to  be  applied,  two  conflicting  philosophies
emerged in reports of successive Royal Commissions and Enquiries. The
first was the doctrine of “collective laissez-faire”. Trade unions should be
accepted  as  lawful  and  given  the  right  to  organise.  The  State  should
recognise the right to strike and the right to bargain collectively to improve
wages and conditions. But so long as the “rules of the game” were roughly
fair  to  both  sides  the  State  should  not  be  concerned  with  its
consequences. In effect the Government should provide facilities to help
the parties agree, but should not interfere to impose a settlement upon
them. It  is  worth stressing that  it  was never any part  of  this  view that
industrial  relations  in  general  or  trade  unions  in  particular  should  be
outside the law; it was merely felt that so far as possible the law should
not interfere with the day-to-day results of collective bargaining.
6. But from the very beginning of  this debate there was an alternative
view: namely, that while the periodic “re-adjustment” of bargaining power
between the two sides was an essential part of the Government's role, it
was not in itself sufficient. The State also had to act at times to contain the
disruptive  consequences  of  the  struggle  for  those  not  immediately
affected especially if  non-intervention was likely to result in widespread
damage  to  the  interests  of  the  community  at  large.  Linked  with  this
argument to an increasing extent was a related one: that Governments
should intervene still  further  if  it  could be shown that  certain important
economic  or  social  objectives  were  not  sufficiently  furthered  or  were
frustrated by collective bargaining.
7. Within the last  hundred years, an example of Government action to
contain the effects of disruption was sections 4 and 5 of the Conspiracy
and Protection of Property Act 1875. This was designed to limit the free-
dom to  strike  where  it  was  likely  to  have  undue  effects  on  essential
services or on life or property.  The Truck Acts,  the creation of  Wages
Councils, and the Fair Wages Resolutions were examples of intervention
to advance objectives which could not at the time be met by collective
bargaining.
8. More recently intervention has become much more necessary and pro-
nounced. The State has laid down minimum periods of notice in contracts
of  employment  in  the  Act  of  1963.  Action  has  been  taken  to  secure
improvements  in  the  quality  and  use  of  labour  by  creating  Industrial
Training Boards and the Redundancy Payments Scheme, both financed
by compulsory levies on industry. The Government has increasingly had
to play a part  in helping to tackle the industrial  problems of  the motor
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industry. Far-reaching reforms have been initiated in worker-management
relations in the docks.
9. As a result  of these and other developments both management and
trade  unions  have  come  to  accept,  and  in  many  ways  positively  to
welcome, Government involvement that in practice goes far beyond the
confines of the theory of non-intervention by the State. While often still
voicing the doctrine of non-intervention, managements and unions have
entered into a positive and mutually beneficial partnership with the State
to secure common objectives. Indeed in their evidence to the Royal Com-
mission  on  Trade  Unions  and  Employers'  Associations,  and  in  their
representations to Government, bodies representing both employers and
trade unionists have urged further intervention and involvement – at least
where they see it as advantageous to them. Demands have been made
by employers for new laws to discourage strikes; requests have been put
forward  on  behalf  of  trade  unions  for  minimum  wage  legislation  and
Government action to force employers to recognise trade unions. In short
the doctrine of non-intervention is not, and never has been, consistently
preached. The need for State intervention and involvement, in association
with  both  sides  of  industry,  is  now admitted  by  almost  everyone.  The
question that remains is, what form should it take at the present time?
[...]
Source: Department of Employment and Productivity, In Place of Strife: A
Policy  for  Industrial  Relations,  London:  Her  Majesty's  Stationery  Office,
Parliamentary Papers, Cmnd. 3888, January 1969, p. 5-7.
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COMMENTARY
Introduction
In the closing years of the 1960s, a decade during which British society witnessed far reaching
societal changes, the Labour Party was actively searching for a way of harnessing trade union
collaboration in order to optimise its economic objectives. Labour had indeed come to power in
1964 promising Great Britain that the “white heat of technology” was the key to the nation's
prosperity but had underestimated both the budget deficit inherited from the Conservatives and
trade union hostility to any measures that might encroach upon their freedom of action. The
situation of relative full-employment meant on the one hand that the unions could command
considerable influence in the highest spheres of government. On the other, it had exacerbated
shop  floor  truculence  which  had  in  turn  reinforced  informal  bargaining  structures  and
consequently weakened central union control over its members.
The title of Command Paper 3888 In Place of Strife presented to Parliament by Barbara Castle,
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity since April 1968, expresses the government's
desire to limit the number of working days lost through strikes. It came in the wake not only of
the Conservatives' policy statement Fair Deal at Work which had put forward the need to use the
law to enforce collective bargaining agreements, but above all the Donovan Report. This latter
was the fruit of three years of intensive work undertaken by a Royal Commission headed by Lord
Donovan. While rejecting the Opposition's demand to use legislation to circumvent trade union
unruliness, it had nevertheless underlined the expansion of local bargaining which was swiftly
becoming the rule rather than the exception. Greater union responsibility was requested by Lord
Donovan and his  collaborators  who were  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that public  opinion too was
becoming more and more hostile to the seemingly perpetual climate of industrial unrest sparked
off by trade union action. Once more, the Labour Party was not giving the impression that it
could govern efficiently and above all its efforts to redress the British economy and implement its
social programme were being hampered. Something had to be done to prevent the trade unions
from being seen to wield excessive power to the extent that they could dictate policies to elected
governments. Yet, the Labour Party had to be wary about cutting off the hand that fed it and was
also particularly keen on promoting the virtues of its own brand of industrial democracy.
“Strife” was thus costly for all parties involved and whereas the Conservatives had expressed
their belief that government could resort to legislation in order to curb trade union influence, a
large proportion of the Labour Party still believed that voluntary and free collective bargaining
was still the best way forward. In this sense, the links between the Labour government and the
unions also epitomised the stressful  relations within the Labour Party itself.  As a prominent
member of the Cabinet, Barbara Castle knew indeed that any trade union reform promoted by
her government could potentially jeopardise its chances of winning the next General Elections or
on the contrary reinforce its political viability not only by securing the unions' votes but also by
ironing  out  disagreements  within  the  Labour  Party  itself.  Her  job  was  therefore  to  use  her
political  talents  to  confront  the  traditional  practise  of  free  collective  bargaining  with a  legal
framework whose aim was to reconcile the interests of employers, unions, government and above
all of the nation.
This short extract, five paragraphs out of a total of one hundred and nineteen, highlights the
role of the unions within the structure of British industrial democracy,  their struggle against
state intervention and the dilemmas the Labour government had to face in order to justify its
policy choices. At times it seems as if ideology fell victim to economic expediency which in turn
undermined the fundamental values that the Labour Party wanted to defend.
The legitimacy of the trade union movement
Great pains are taken by Barbara Castle in this extract to refrain from vilifying the trade
union movement. Although tensions between government and the unions may have come to a
head during the 1960s, the Minister quickly points out that worker organisations had constantly
had to  “[struggle]  to  advance  and  protect  their  interests”  (line 5)  and  “combine  in  their  own
defence”  (line 7).  It  is  true  that  the  scene  had  been  set  by  the  very  first  “combinations”  of
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workers – more often than not in the form of “Friendly Societies” – who could be punished under
the  common law of  “conspiracy  in  restraint  of  trade”.  There  was no  specific  legislation  that
acknowledged the rights of workers to cease selling their labour in an attempt to improve their
lot. Hence the ensuing struggle to win legal recognition from Parliament whose Members, at least
until the late nineteenth century and the extension of the male franchise, tended to view any
form of worker organisation with alarm. The Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, which were
repealed in 1824, testify to the government's desire to nip all kinds of industrial unrest, seditious
or not, in the bud.
It was essentially with the growth of industrialisation following the Industrial Revolution that
“laissez-faire”  emerged  as  the  prevalent  doctrine  in  the  field  of  industrial  relations.  While
craftsmen were  in a position to  command relatively  decent  conditions  of  work thanks to  the
scarcity of their skills, other workers realised that the only way for them to defeat the abuses of
“laissez-faire” was to combine their forces. Herein lies one of the main principles and fundamental
ambiguities of the British trade union movement which Barbara Castle points out quite clearly.
By confirming on the one hand that “The State [...] has always had to provide a framework of law
for dealing with the activities of individuals and groups struggling to advance and protect their
interests” (line 1-3) and on the other “it was never any part of this view that industrial relations in
general or trade unions in particular should be outside the law” (line 19) the Minister highlights
the stark reality that British trade unionism has traditionally been organised more along the
lines of immunity from the law rather than according to a strict code of practise established by
Parliament. This ambiguity is underlined further when Barbara Castle mentions the “demands
[which] have been made by employers for new laws to discourage strikes” (lines 51-52 emphasis
added) as if there is no question of using the law to make industrial action simply illegal. In other
words action undertaken in the name of a worker organisation can be held to be legal whereas
beyond  the  boundary  of  this  remit  this  legality  ceases.  Therefore,  legislating  in  the  field  of
industrial relations is precisely a question of striking a tricky balance between interpreting the
law so as to accommodate legitimate trade union action while bearing in mind that “it [the law]
should seek to defend the wider interests of the community” (line 10).
These principles are enshrined in the 1876 Trade Union Amendment Act which was passed in
the wake of  the 1971 Trade Union Act  and above all  the 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act mentioned in line 31. Whereas by referring to only two sections of the law Barbara
Castle suggests that it “was designed to limit the freedom to strike where it was likely to have
undue effects on essential services or on life or property” (lines 32-33), in reality it enabled the
authorities  to  adopt  a  lenient  stance  towards  illegal  conflict  organised  within  the  scope  of
industrial relations thus contributing indirectly to the legitimacy of otherwise unlawful action.
This is all the more true in a context of full employment – as was the case in the 1960s – when
trade unionism is particularly strong and union activity geared towards increasing their “clout”.
On the other hand, as events during the 1980s have made crystal clear, when unions are weak, it
is far easier for Parliament to use legislation to limit the incremental increase in their power.
The emergence  of  amalgamated trade  unions  in  the  latter  half  of  the  19 th century  was  a
response to the need for unskilled workers to unite in order to increase their influence. This was
all the more important as by virtue of “collective laissez-faire” (line 12), the unwritten rule was for
the State to intervene only when either the unions or employers overstepped the mark in terms of
the methods employed to improve their respective positions. This is reminiscent of such notable
trade union insurrection as Luddism or the events in Sheffield in 1866 when undue force was
used to impose the unions' point of view. On other occasions however, for example when unfair
competition tended to drive wages down well  below thresholds of decency,  the State had felt
obliged to intervene on behalf of employees. This somewhat qualifies the statement that “as far as
possible the law should not interfere with the day-to-day results of collective bargaining” (line 25).
Barbara Castle is keen to emphasise the historic spirit of fairplay that characterises industrial
relations – despite the brutality  with which police and strikers  have clashed on a number of
occasions and especially in 1926 – with each party healthily probing in search of a legitimate role
to play. To this end, industrial relations are considered to be a game with the State's role reduced
to arbitrator thus by definition unconcerned with the “consequences” (line 16).  In short,  State
recognition of trade unions should in ideal circumstances be limited to their scope of action rather
than to the results obtained.
The  union  movement  was  to  gain  political  recognition  in  the  shape  of  the  Labour
Representation Committee founded in 1900 which adopted the name “Labour Party” in 1906. It
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was made up of trade unionists and sponsored by their movement. To this end, Barbara Castle is
the mouthpiece of a political party that relies essentially on union funding and support to remain
afloat: as the expression goes, the Labour Party was indeed born from the bowels of the trade
unions.  Her  task  is  therefore  to  justify  government –  and  more  specifically  her  Labour
government's – intervention in a sphere where antagonism had reached a head, fuelled by the
relationship between the body politic and the corporate trade union movement. In view of this,
“the conventional doctrine of ‘laissez-faire’” (line 6) was at some stage bound to be challenged by
the government in an attempt to replace it with its own “alternative view” (line 21) of “live and let
live”.
Justifying government intervention
Once the Labour Party had been established as a genuine political movement one of its main
tasks was to ensure that it could attract and maintain an electorate. This was naturally to be
found within the ranks of the working population and obviously the trade unions who now had a
form of political expression within Parliament. During the Great War, trade unions increased
their influence throughout industry and a new wave of amalgamations began with shop stewards
emerging as the vital linkmen between central organisations and the shopfloor.  By 1919, the
central  union  organisation,  the  Trades  Union  Congress  (TUC),  could  boast  some 6.5  million
members but during the next decade their ranks withered. Despite their efforts to mobilise the
Triple Alliance between dockers, miners and transport workers, the 1926 General Strike was a
failure  and  enabled  the  Conservative  government  to  ban  sympathetic  strikes  and  introduce
contracting-in whereby unions had to explicitly request members' approval before deducting the
political levy from their wages. Already, government felt that trade unions were taking advantage
of their influence without systematically referring decisions to the rank and file for approval.
Hence  the regular need for  Parliament to “examine how far  the law should tolerate  ‘coercive’
action in ‘restraint of trade’ by employers or trade unions” (lines 8-9). 
Despite  these  setbacks,  the  Second  World  War  enabled  the  trade  unions  to  ingratiate
themselves more than ever before in the eyes of public opinion. Even though the war period had
witnessed its fair share of industrial unrest, the overall climate of this international conflict was
symbolised by the “Spirit of Dunkirk”, even within the ranks of the trade unions. Both the Labour
Party and the  unions had participated in the  National  Government  during the  war and the
landslide victory of Clement Attlee's Labour Party in 1945 meant that the long-term problems of
reconstruction could be broached against a backdrop of  political  stability.  Yet  the problem of
union representation was to remain a bone of contention between successive governments of all
persuasions and trade unions.
In this respect, Barbara Castle refrains from politicising her recommendations too explicitly.
The  Labour  Party  is  not  mentioned  in  this  extract  as  if  the  terms  “Government”,  “State”,
“Parliament” and “the courts” (§5) lend more absolute weight to her ideas. Her arguments are
supported by the findings of “Royal Commissions and Inquiries” (line 12 and again in line 48) and
legislation passed under opposition governments is mentioned. In this sense, her intention is for
her propositions to transcend traditional party political barriers as illustrated by the opening
sentences  which  boldly  state  that  “[t]he  State  has  always been  involved  in  the  process  of
industrial relations” and “It has always had to provide...” (emphasis added). As the title of this
extract suggests, the Cabinet Minister attempts to justify her Party's action by referring to the
historical  responsibilities  that  befall  any  government  in  the  field  of  industrial  relations.  By
assuming this  task,  In Place  of  Strife was not  so  much  the  expression  of  any  revolutionary
measures as a policy statement to show that the Labour Party was able to govern.
This is why while acknowledging the inalienable rights that have been acquired by the unions,
Barbara Castle strives to pinpoint the duties of the present government in terms of its historical
legacy. By stating that “The State should recognise the right to strike and the right to bargain
collectively to improve wages and conditions” (line 13-14) and “the Government should provide
facilities  to help the parties agree,  but should not interfere to impose a settlement upon them”
(line 16-17),  the Secretary of  State attempts to  come to terms with the fact that government
cannot shirk its fundamental responsibilities in the field of industrial relations. Also, at different
instances in this extract historical facts are used to show that government intervention may, at
times, be the result of political choice: the Truck Acts which guaranteed paid wages to workers,
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the Wages Councils which established minimum wages and the Fair Wages Resolutions (§7) are
ideal examples to show how Parliament at times chose to intervene directly in order to improve
working conditions. In the contemporary context this “involvement” is assumed more often than
not in accordance with union demands: “requests have been put forward on behalf of trade unions
for minimum wage legislation...” (line 68). Paragraph 8 mentions several recent occasions when
direct intervention was deemed necessary in order to accomplish a certain number of “periodic
‘readjustments’” (line 24).
It would have been relatively easy at this stage for Barbara Castle to point out the fact that
government  intervention  had  at  times  been  necessary  in  order  to  compensate  for  union
weaknesses.  That Parliament should have had to establish minimum wages and ensure  that
employers respect the same conditions of pay nationwide implies in many ways that trade unions
were incapable of defending their brethren. However she refrains from doing this by underlining
the fact  that industrial  relations  should not  fundamentally  be built  upon opposition between
government and the unions. This show of political pragmatism is taken a step further with her
rejection of the “theory of non-intervention by the State” (line 45) and again when an attempt is
made to depict intervention as being mainly “involvement” (line 74). According to the Minister,
theoretical non-intervention is the main weakness of the historical legacy that seems to dictate
many of the rules that bind the State, employers and unions in their perpetual struggle for power.
Reality on the other hand paints a different picture since “managements and unions have entered
into a positive and mutually beneficial partnership with the State to secure common objectives”
(lines 46-47).
In this way, employers and trade unions are also portrayed as being able to assume their
responsibilities in a “positive” way and paragraph 9 highlights the various occasions when trade
unions have worked hand in hand with the government and have not confined their action to
mere  opposition.  Even  so,  it  is  at  this  stage  that  the  Minister  tries  to  attribute  the  recent
improvements in industrial relations to her Party's “involvement” used specifically in comparison
with “intervention”. The examples of collaboration all relate to recent developments as if  this
sudden mood change could be dated back to the first Wilson government which took office in
1964.
Free collective bargaining versus a planned economy
The post-war social democratic consensus was broadly based on the creation of the Welfare
State and the participation of employers and the trade unions in a Keynesian inspired planned
economy. The trade unions had worked closely with the Labour Party during preparations for the
1945 election and fully approved of the Labour government's ambitions to use its powers in order
to stimulate growth, create the necessary conditions for full employment and above all reduce
social inequalities. Their newly acquired legitimacy meant that they could rely on their principles
of free collective bargaining being maintained. At the same time, to encourage responsible union
action, their presence was encouraged in the highest spheres of decision making even though
their role was officially claimed to be one of mere consultation.
The Labour government which won a landslide victory in 1945 was committed to an extensive
programme of nationalisations. This was to make sure that the control of industry be guaranteed
by the State as stipulated in Clause IV of the Labour Party's constitution. True to their word, the
Bank  of  England,  gas,  electricity,  the  railways  and  the  mines  were  nationalised.  When  the
Conservatives were returned to power in 1951, their slim majority meant that they too had to
accommodate trade union influence. In their quest to maintain social peace, they adopted a more
flexible stance vis-à-vis shop-floor resistance to their economic objectives to the extent that during
their  thirteen  years  in  government,  industrial  unrest  was  relatively  subdued.  Even  so,  the
kickback  on  this  attitude  was  a  transfer  of  authority  away  from  the  centre  of  trade  union
organisation to the rank and file.
Ultimately this was to lead to a situation whereby union action in the form of wildcat strikes
and certain practises such as the closed shop came under fire from public opinion and to a certain
extent both sides of Parliament. Barbara Castle talks about the “disruptive consequences of the
struggle for those not immediately affected” (line 26) for indeed the informal locally based pay
bargaining  structures  organised  outside  any  agreements  reached  with  the  government  were
gradually replacing “legitimate” ones. This had recently had particularly disastrous effects during
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the  seamen's  strike  in  1966  and  in  the  car  industry,  mentioned  in  paragraph  8,  when  in
November 1968, 22 operatives stopped work at the Girling brake factory and laid off thousands of
workers in the “motor industry” mentioned in line 41. In these two cases, a limited number of
employees had been able to cause a maximum amount of damage not only to their own industries
but also to national interests. The overall ensuing wages drift meant that politicians were in a far
weaker position to put forward an overall plan for the national economy. Given this situation,
when the Labour Party won the two elections in 1964, the second one being organised in order to
improve their majority in Parliament, it had to bear in mind “that Governments should intervene
still  further if  it  could be shown that certain important economic or social  objectives were not
sufficiently furthered or were frustrated by collective bargaining” (line 27-29). To show that the
Labour Party could be entrusted with the helm of the nation, a thorough shake-up of trade union
representation in national politics was required. But any reform would have to take place in the
knowledge that 131 out of the 348 Labour MPs were sponsored directly by the trade unions and
there was little hope of them voting against their masters.
The Conservatives had attempted to improve their relations with the trade unions by creating
successively the National Economic Development Council, the Council on Prices Productivity and
Incomes and the National Incomes Commission but the stronger unions were in no mood to pay
much heed to the government's calls for restraint in pay bargaining. Faced with a £800 million
budget deficit, Wilson's Labour government desperately worked out a statement of incomes policy
with employers and the unions which took the form of a “Declaration of Intent on Productivity,
Prices and Incomes” published in December 1964. A National Board for prices and Incomes was
established and in 1965 a Royal Commission headed by Lord Donovan was appointed to study the
problems of industrial relations. His examination of trade unions took three years and came to
the conclusion that informal bargaining structures were at the root of most evils. But contrary to
the radical opponents of unions, the Donovan Report held the point of view that strikes were
above all symptomatic of the overall failure to devise institutions in keeping with changing needs.
Reform of the collective bargaining system was recommended but recourse to compulsory powers
was rejected.
Barbara Castle is perfectly aware of the influence of the Donovan Report, but knows that its
remit  was  strictly  limited  to  the  field  of  industrial  relations.  Unlike  Donovan,  her  own
recommendations are going to be subjected to far more intensive political scrutiny insofar as she
is walking the tightrope with her Party's political future. To this end, by stating that “bodies
representing both employers and trade unions have urged further intervention and involvement –
at  least  where  they  see  it  as  advantageous  to  them”  (line 50-51,  emphasis  added),  the
Minister clearly questions the ability of the unions to respect the well established “rules of the
game” (line 15). It seems she is eager to point out that at times government intervention has been
necessary in order to protect the most vulnerable flanks of its movement with the Wages Councils
and the Fair Wages Resolutions being ideal “examples of intervention to advance objectives which
could not at the time be met by collective bargaining” (line 34-35). This seems to be a particularly
euphemistic way of expressing her Party's irritation about the unions' churlish attitude whereby
they were favourable to State intervention when it suited them. Indeed, minimum wage fixing for
the most  vulnerable categories of  workers  enabled the unions to  concentrate  on the stronger
elements  of  their  movement  and  government  would  have  much  appreciated  greater  union
recognition of their own weaknesses in the form of greater respect for the Chancellor's “National
Plan” for example.
It must be said that since being elected, the Labour government had had to deal not only with a
severe budget deficit but a consistently weak pound as strike action caused confidence in British
currency to plummet. Devaluation had been decided in November 1967 as a last resort, especially
in Prime Minister Wilson's eyes. These economic difficulties could therefore only be worsened by
trade union truculence which was not  only jeopardising attempts to  foster healthy industrial
relations but also the government's efforts to fulfil its social ambitions. Thus irresponsible trade
unionism –  described  as  “widespread  damage”  (line 25)  in  this  extract –  is  seen  as  having
frustrated Labour's attempts to use Britain's industrial potential in order to alleviate the plight of
the poorer members of society. Not only did their political allegiance with the unions suffer from
poor industrial relations but also the support from their grass root electorate.
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Conclusion
Whereas Donovan had tried to  deal  with industrial  relations with a velvet  glove,  the new
Secretary of State chose a more forceful approach. This can in part be attributed to the fact that
the Prime Minister himself was feeling very politically unsure at the time and possibly considered
that hardline tactics to curb the unions would be supported at least by public opinion. The Labour
Party was in the throes of an internal crisis at the time and five major figures had resigned over
various issues, including the government's desire to use legislation to limit the scope of unofficial
strikes. Nevertheless, it was the Party's leadership that was causing the greatest amount of ill-
feeling.
Given this context, Barbara Castle had a clear remit to go beyond the recommendations of the
Donovan Report and indeed the traditional power of “re-adjustment”, but she was reticent about
taking  coercive  action  in  order  to  restrain  union  action.  She  chose  instead  to  underline  the
responsibilities that the legacy of history had bestowed both on the trade unions and governments
of all persuasions in the field of industrial relations. In doing so she rejected the theory that non-
intervention had ever been a viable alternative especially since, on many occasions, government
had felt that workers needed protection above and beyond that provided by the different unions.
If intervention by Parliament could be justified in these circumstances then there was no reason
that it should not be used in order to stop the more disruptive elements of the union movement
from wreaking havoc.
But it would be short-sighted to suggest that the government's sole aim was to rein in union
power for the sake of more harmonious industrial relations. The Labour Party's political future
was at stake not only in terms of its ability to harness the trade union vote but also as far as its
electoral promises were concerned. The pulse of the Labour Party's economic strategy, deemed to
be the key to implementing its social policies, could be felt through its relations with the trade
unions. Without their collaboration, bringing the effects of other economic factors under control –
such as the budget deficit and weak sterling – was proving to be an impossible task. This was
considerably hampering Labour's efforts to fulfil its traditional political ambitions and the Party
feared that this might ultimately lead to its downfall as voters questioned its ability to govern. 
The time had perhaps come to make a stand given the constant toing and froing between pay
pauses, wage freezes, wage standstills, guiding lights, price plateaus, severe restraint; in fact a
whole  plethora  of  terms  which  deftly  summed  up  the  contemporary  relationship  between
successive governments and the trade unions. Nevertheless, the fact that the proposals laid out in
In Place of Strife were defeated in Parliament with many Labour MPs casting their vote against
their own Party is  clear proof  that the time was not  yet  ripe  to  force  the trade unions into
accepting that Parliament be allowed to meddle too directly in what they continued to believe
were their own affairs. As long as the unions were (too) strong, the fine balance between the
powers  of  the State,  employers and workers  would constantly  be fraught with difficulty.  The
Conservatives, reelected in 1970, paid the price of believing that legislation could be used to bring
the unions to  heel  by  being  ousted from power  four  years  later.  From 1974 to  1979 Labour
resorted once again to intense collaboration with the unions in the form of the Social Contract but
to no avail. It was with the election of Mrs Thatcher in 1979, ten years after In Place of Strife,
that strong government was to become the deciding element of the Divine Trinity in industrial
relations.
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